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FRACKING FOR SHALE GAS IN THE UK: 
                                                    RISKS, REPUTATION AND REGULATION 
 
Introduction 
The identification of potentially exploitable large shale gas reserves, and plans for 
their subsequent commercial development by hydraulic fracturing, popularly known as 
fracking, within many countries of the world have generated mixed responses. In the United 
States, for example, the introduction of new drilling and fracturing technologies in the late 
ϭϵϵϬ͛s saǁ the rapid ĐoŵŵerĐial deǀelopŵeŶt of shale gas resourĐes aĐross ŵany areas of 
the country which in turn prompted the exploitation of shale gas reserves in Canada. By way 
of contrast the identification and possible development of shale gas in parts of Europe has 
met with considerable public and political opposition. In France, which has the greatest 
potential shale gas resources, a moratorium on fracking has been in place since 2011, and 
was upheld in 2013 and Germany has not allowed any fracking since 2011. In June 2015 a 
majority of Members of the European Parliament voted for a moratorium on fracking which 
was described as ͚a Đleaƌ iŶdiĐatioŶ that puďliĐ aĐĐeptaŶĐe foƌ this iŶdustƌǇ is ĐƌuŵďliŶg 
aĐƌoss the EU͛ (Food and Water Europe 2015, webpage).  
Within the UK there has recently been increasing interest in Government circles and 
amongst energy companies about the identification of potentially large scale shale gas 
reserves and the Government ͚ďelieǀes that shale gas has the poteŶtial to pƌoǀide the UK 
ǁith gƌeateƌ eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ, gƌoǁth aŶd joďs͛ (Gov. UK 2014a , webpage). Despite this 
interest exploration for shale gas is still at an early stage in the UK and there are currently 
no definitive or meaningful estimates of the likely shale gas reserves or of what proportion 
of the potential reserves MAY be practically and commercially recoverable. However the 
possible future commercial development of the shale gas reserves, by fracking, has also 
generated concerns about a wide range of environmental risks. Two linked factors seem to 
be important in addressing these concerns and arguably in facilitating the future 
development of shale gas resources within the UK. On the one hand the Government has 
emphasised its commitment to a regulatory regime designed to protect the environment 
and ensure public safety. On the other hand there is a commercial consensus that ͚the 
industry needs to control reputation and ƌisk͛ and that ͚Ŷegatiǀe puďliĐ opiŶioŶ aďout 
environmental safety of the hydraulic fracturing process could undermine the development 
of this iŶdustƌǇ͛ KPMG (2011, p.19). With this in mind this chapter offers a case study of the 
current debate surrounding the potential for fracking for shale gas in the UK. It begins with 
some introductory contextual thoughts on the changing and contested geographies of 
energy resources, describes the characteristics of shale gas and the process of fracking and 
outlines the scale and geography of potential shale gas reserves within the UK. The main 
body of the chapter provides a commentary on the environmental risks and issues 
associated with exploration and development of these reserves, reviews the contrasting and 
contested positions on the benefits and costs of shale gas development and examines the 
evolution of the regulatory framework with specific emphasis on planning policy and 
practice.   
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The Changing and Contested Geographies of Energy Supply 
 In introducing the ͚Neǁ Geogƌaphies of Gloďal EŶeƌgǇ ͚, )iŵŵerer ;ϮϬϭϯ) suggested 
that geography is ͚ĐƌuĐial to addƌessiŶg the ŵultiple, iŶteƌĐoŶŶeĐted diŵeŶsioŶs of the 
current potpourri of global eŶeƌgǇ dileŵŵas aŶd oppoƌtuŶities͛ and Bridge (2012) argued 
that ͚the ŵaŶŶeƌ iŶ ǁhiĐh eŶeƌgǇ is Đaptuƌed aŶd tƌaŶsfoƌŵed lies at the heaƌt of soĐietǇ͛s 
ƌelatioŶship ǁith the Ŷatuƌal ǁoƌld.͛  The geography of energy supply changes as new 
resources are discovered and old ones become depleted and/or economically unviable and 
as technological development makes reserves more accessible and economically 
recoverable. Bradshaw (2009), for example, charted the geographical dimensions of energy 
supply and demand and the recent global shift in the location of energy production and 
demand growth and argued that ͚this shift is the ƌesult of iŶĐƌeasiŶg deŵaŶd iŶ eŵeƌgiŶg 
ŵaƌkets suĐh as ChiŶa aŶd IŶdia͛ aŶd that ͚the centres of production are now focused on the 
Middle East, AfƌiĐa aŶd the foƌŵeƌ Soǀiet UŶioŶ.͛  Changes in the geography of energy 
production are also occurring within countries looking to make the transition to a more 
sustainable energy supply based on renewable sources and in some cases to develop 
recently discovered fossil fuels.  
In addressing the ͚geogƌaphies of eŶeƌgǇ tƌaŶsitioŶ͛ Bridge et. al. (2013) suggest that 
͚the eŶeƌgǇ ĐhalleŶge iŶ the tǁeŶtǇ-first century is to bring about a new transition towards a 
more sustainable energy system characterised by universal access to energy services and 
security and reliability of supply from efficient low-ĐaƌďoŶ souƌĐes.͛ Bradshaw (2010) has 
argued that ͚ǁe Ŷoǁ faĐe a gloďal eŶeƌgǇ dileŵŵa Đƌeated ďǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout futuƌe 
availability of fossil fuels and the impaĐt of theiƌ eǆploitatioŶ oŶ the plaŶetaƌǇ eĐosǇsteŵ.͛  
Bradshaw (2010) further suggested that within the ͚deǀeloped ŵaƌket eĐoŶoŵies͛ the 
solution to this energy dilemma ͚is ďeiŶg sought thƌough iŶĐƌeased eŶeƌgǇ effiĐieŶĐǇ, ĐaƌďoŶ 
trading, the development of technologies to de-carbonise fossil fuel use and electricity 
geŶeƌatioŶ aŶd the pƌoŵotioŶ of ƌeŶeǁaďle eŶeƌgǇ aŶd ŶuĐleaƌ poǁeƌ.͛  That said Bridge 
et.al. (2013) argued that ͚the geogƌaphiĐal iŵpliĐatioŶs of this Ŷeǁ eŶeƌgǇ paƌadigŵ aƌe Ŷot 
well defined aŶd a ƌaŶge of Ƌuite diffeƌeŶt geogƌaphiĐal futuƌes aƌe ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ possiďle.͛ 
However within developed market economies renewable forms of energy generation 
cannot fully match current levels of demand and as such fossil fuels will remain a crucial 
element in the global energy mix into the foreseeable future. Where possible, many 
countries may look to exploit newly discovered indigenous fossil fuel resources while also 
pursuing a transition to more sustainable sources of energy supply.  
At the same time in a seemingly increasingly volatile and unstable international 
environment concerns about the security of energy supplies loom large. Bridge (2010), for 
example, argued  that ͚the Issues of eŶeƌgǇ aǀailaďilitǇ aŶd the ǀulnerability of fuel supplies 
have assumed new political prominence , so that hoary questions about depletion and 
security now share space on the environment and development agendas with greenhouse 
gas eŵissioŶs aŶd atŵospheƌiĐ pollutioŶ.͛ Energy security is a wide ranging and complex 
issue and in identifying ͚the keǇ eŶeƌgǇ poliĐǇ issues foƌ eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ iŶ the UK͛, Hoggett 
et.al. (2011), for example, suggested that energy policy is ͚a reflection of the sort of society 
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that is wanted, including whether it is acceptable that the UK has large numbers of fuel 
poor; whether the UK should act as a responsible global nation/friend; if there is a concern 
aďout the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt; aŶd that the ďalaŶĐe is ďetǁeeŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt aŶd seĐuƌitǇ͛. The 
issue of energy security also has important geographical dimensions. Bridge et. al. (2013) 
argued that ͚the diffeƌeŶt eleŵeŶts of a poliĐǇ to pƌoŵote eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ……. ƌest oŶ 
assuŵptioŶs aďout the geogƌaphiĐal sĐale at ǁhiĐh eŶeƌgǇ sǇsteŵs should ďe goǀeƌŶed.͛  
Further Bridge et. al. (2013) suggested that ͚eŶsuƌiŶg the availability and accessibility of 
energy services in a carbon constrained world will require developing new ways- and new 
geographies- of pƌoduĐiŶg , liǀiŶg aŶd ǁoƌkiŶg ǁith eŶeƌgǇ.͛  
It is important to recognise that emerging energy landscapes have become a focal 
point of debate within many countries and concerns are increasingly being raised about 
these energy landscapes and more specifically about the benefits and costs new energy 
developments bring to a range of stakeholders and particularly to those local communities 
where developments are taking place. Calvert and Mabee (2013 webpage), for example, 
argued that ͚the uŶiƋue phǇsiĐal pƌopeƌties oƌ ŵateƌialities ;i.e. ƋualitǇ, ƋuaŶtitǇ, loĐatioŶ͛Ϳ 
of emerging energy resources are at the root of disruptive change to physical and social 
landscapes, and therefore of social resistance to policy efforts aimed at a sustainable energy 
futuƌe.͛ Selman (2010, ), for example, has argued that ͚eŶeƌgǇ is likelǇ to ďe a ŵajoƌ dƌiǀeƌ of 
new landscapes as society seeks ǁaǇs of ǁeaŶiŶg itself off fossil ĐaƌďoŶ fuels͛ and that 
͚soĐietǇ͛s iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ eaƌŶest puƌsuit of sustaiŶaďle deǀelopŵeŶt ǁill iŶǀolǀe laŶdsĐape 
ĐhaŶges that attƌaĐt pƌotest aŶd oppositioŶ.͛ More generally Jiusto (2009, p.534) has called 
for research into how society is ͚ĐoŶtestiŶg the Ŷeǆt eŶeƌgǇ ƌeǀolutioŶ͛ and Bridge (2012, 
p.7).  has emphasised the need to explore ͚contemporary energy dilemmas–such as 
determining whether, how and for whom particular landscapes should be valued for their 
energy generating potential, or deciding on the geographical scale at which trade-offs 
ďetǁeeŶ eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ aŶd eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal iŵpaĐt should ďe ŵade.͛   
Shale Gas and Fracking  
Shale gas is natural gas, mainly composed of methane, trapped in organic rich shale 
beds often located between 3,250 and 13, 000 feet below the ground. Traditionally within 
the UK shale has not been seen as a reservoir rock rather as a source rock in which gas, and 
oil, are stored before migrating into sandstone or limestone where they have been 
commercially exploited in a conventional manner. Indeed gas and oil produced from shale 
are ofteŶ teĐhŶiĐallǇ referred to as ͚uŶĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal hǇdroĐarďoŶs.͛ Shale gas is accessed by 
fracking. The process involves drilling vertically perhaps 5,000 feet or more below the 
surface and then drilling a number of horizontal boreholes in several directions. The 
horizontal drilling means large areas of shale gas can be reached while minimising the 
number of surface boreholes and this facilitates drilling to less accessible locations. The 
fracking process involves pumping a mixture of fluids at high pressure into the shale, which 
creates a path for the gas to flow into the borehole and thence to the surface. Water makes 
up some 90% of the fluids used in fracking and a large field with 1500 horizontal wells can 
use up to 20 million gallons of water per day. The water is mixed with gelling agents, which 
help to prise open the fractures, sandy materials, which hold open the fractures, chemicals, 
which reduce surface friction during the fracking process, and biocides, which kill bacteria 
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The development of shale gas reserves includes three distinct stages namely 
exploration; production; and decommissioning. During the first stage two or three wells are 
normally drilled  usiŶg a Ϯϱ ŵetre high struĐture kŶoǁŶ as a ͚ǁell oǀer rig͛, aŶd floǁ tested,  
to determine the incidence of shale gas reserves and this process normally takes up to two 
weeks. Production involves the commercial development of these reserves which may, 
depending on the size of the reserve, continue for up to 20 years. When the shale gas 
reserve reaches the end of its lifespan decommissioning involves filling the well with 
cement, to prevent further gas flowing into watercourses or to the surface, and capping and 
landscaping the well head. 
The principle of fracking is not new. Explosive charges containing nitro-glycerine 
ǁere first dropped doǁŶ ǁells iŶ the US iŶ the ϭϴϴϬ͛s to shatter hard roĐk to release gas or 
oil. Hydraulic fracturing dates from the late 1ϵϰϬ͛s, initially on an experimental basis on a 
gas field in Kansas in the US, and then on a commercial basis in Oklahoma and Texas.  The 
fraĐkiŶg of shale gas first took plaĐe oŶ a deŵoŶstratioŶ ďasis iŶ the ϭϵϳϬ͛s ďut it ǁas earlǇ 
in the 21st century before the technique began to be  employed on a large scale commercial 
basis.  Since then developments in drilling and exploitation technology have seen dramatic 
growth in the fracking of shale gas within the US. By 2013 shale gas was estimated to 
account for the largest share of total US natural gas production (US Energy Information 
Administration 2013) and to have transformed the energy landscape within the US. Shale 
gas resources are now being exploited in West Virginia, Pennsylvania and New York State in 
the east across to Colorado and New Mexico and from Michigan in the north and as far 
south as Texas. In summarizing trends within the US KPMG (2013, p.2) suggested that the 
commercial development of shale gas reserves will continue ͚foƌ the foƌeseeaďle futuƌe.͛ At 
the same time KPMG (2013, p.8) reports that ͚iŶĐoŶsisteŶt eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal ƌegulatioŶs͛ have 
͚led iŶvestors to shun certain states, such as New York, in favour of those which are more 
supportive of development, such as Texas, North Dakota, Pennsylvania aŶd West ViƌgiŶia.͛ 
Globally the  Institute for Energy Research (2015)  estimated that the total 
technically recoverable shale gas reserves are some 255, 465 trillion cubic feet with China, 
Argentina, Algeria, the US and Canada accounting for 45% of this total. While the term 
technically recoverable reserves is used to describe the volume of shale gas that could be 
produced with current technology, three factors, namely the cost of drilling and establishing 
wells, the volume of gas produced from a well during its lifetime and the price received for 
the gas, shape the economics of recovery. China has the largest shale gas resources in the 
world but many of these are located deep below the surface in mountainous rocky desert 
areas.  The installation of production equipment and the construction of pipeline 
connections to the existing gas network seem likely to impede the commercial exploitation 
of these resources. In Australia there are sizeable shale gas reserves in both South and West 
Australia and in the Norther Territories. In Southern Australia, for example, production 
drilling began in 2012 in the Cooper Basin and here optimistic estimates suggest that up to 
Ϯϱ,ϬϬϬ ǁells ŵaǇ ďe iŶ produĐtioŶ ďǇ the late ϮϬϮϬ͛s ;UCL International Energy Policy 
Institute2 013). That said here and elsewhere in Australia the need for the development of 
new pipelines to transport gas to existing networks and thence to centers of market 
demand and regulatory problems in allowing access to existing pipelines by new contractors 
may well slow the pace of development. Within Western Europe shale gas reserves have 
been identified in the Netherlands, Ireland, France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, 
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Denmark Sweden and Norway, as well as in the UK, but KPMG (2011, p. 12) suggested that 
as reserves in a number of these countries ͚teŶd to ďe Đlose to populated aƌeas aŶd as 
European environmental laws tend to be quite strict, the potential for significant shale gas 
production theƌe iŶ the Ŷeaƌ futuƌe seeŵs uŶlikelǇ.͛ 
Potential Shale Gas Reserves in the UK 
 Within the UK there are several areas where Carboniferous and Jurassic shale beds 
have the potential to produce shale gas including sizeable areas of north-west, central and 
eastern England, smaller parts of south and north east England, central Scotland and 
Northern Ireland.  Although the commercial development of shale gas has been underway in 
the US for over twenty years exploration for shale gas reserves within the UK is still very 
much in its infancy. There are currently no national estimates of how much shale gas will be 
technically and economically recoverable. The geological conditions are complex in that 
many of the shale basins are not large continuous structures, such as those found in many 
North American shale regions, but more typically comprise small fault-bounded sub-basins 
(Advanced Resources International 2013). At the same time the exploratory process is costly 
with some estimates suggesting that the average cost of drilling an exploratory well in the 
UK is some £6 million compared to £2.4 million in the US (Ratcliffe 2014). 
The British Geological Survey, iŶ assoĐiatioŶ ǁith the UK GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s DepartŵeŶt 
for Energy and Climate Change, has undertaken a number of shale resource estimates for 
some areas of the UK. In 2013, for example, the British Geological Survey published their 
estimate of shale gas resources in the Bowland-Hodder Shale Gas Resources underlying an 
area stretching from north Wales and Blackpool in the east to Scarborough and Nottingham 
in the west (British Geological Survey 2015a, webpage). Given geological uncertainty this 
estimate ranged from 822 trillion cubic feet (tcf) to 2281 tcf with the central estimate being 
1329 tcf. That said the British Geological Survey stressed that ͚Ŷot eŶough is Ǉet kŶoǁŶ to 
estiŵate a ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ faĐtoƌ͛ nor to estimate ͚hoǁ ŵuĐh gas ŵaǇ ďe ultiŵatelǇ pƌoduĐed͛ 
(British Geological Survey/Department of Energy and Climate Change 2013, p, 3). Estimates 
of the Carboniferous shales in the Midland Valley of Scotland ranged from 49 tcf to 135 tcf 
with the central estimate being 80 tcf but the British Geological Survey suggested that ͚the 
relatively complex geology and limited amount of good quality constraining data result in a 
higher degree of uncertainty to the Midland Valley of Scotland shale gas estimate than the 
Bowland-Hoddeƌ͛ study. (British Geological Survey 2015b, webpage). 
 A number of small energy companies, including Cuadrilla, IGas, Third Energy and 
Celtique Energie, have undertaken test drilling  wells principally in West Lancashire, 
Cheshire, Manchester, Somerset, East Yorkshire, South Wales and Northern Ireland.. 
Cuadrilla, for example, began drilling in 2010 at Preese Hall in Lancashire but following some 
seismic activity associated with the hydraulic fracturing, the company suspended 
exploration activity and plugged the well. In response the UK Government announced a 
moratorium on fracking in July 2011 but following further investigations and consultations 
permission was given to resume exploratory drilling in December 2012. More recently 
Cuadrilla recommenced exploratory drilling, and obtained planning permission for such 
drilling, elsewhere in Lancashire. and Dart Energy, have acquired planning permission for 
exploratory fracking in Dumfries and Galloway and submitted planning applications for 
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exploration in the Falkirk and Stirling area of central Scotland. The Scottish Government 
announced a moratorium on all consents for fracking for shale gas in January 2015 and the 
Welsh Government imposed a similar moratorium the following month and in the light of 
these developments the main body of this chapter focuses on fracking for shale gas in 
England. (REFERENCE)? 
 Environmental Issues and Risks 
 The momentum behind shale gas development within the UK has been accompanied 
by growing and increasingly vocal concerns about the environmental impact of fracking.  A 
wide range of environmental issues and risks have been identified. These include climate 
change; fugitive carbon dioxide and methane emissions; water use, waste water treatment 
and water pollution; seismic activity; air pollution; noise; visual intrusion; damage to valued 
and heritage landscapes; and the fragmentation and loss of habitats, damage to species and 
reductions in bio-diversity. The potential environmental risks are manifest at a variety of, 
often partly interlinked, spatial and temporal scales. Concerns about carbon dioxide 
emissions and climate change might, for example, be seen to be global though they have 
iŵpliĐatioŶs for the UK GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s ŶatioŶal targets on the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
 Shale gas, like other natural gases, is not a low carbon source of fuel and the large 
scale development of shale gas would certainly not be consistent with a transition towards a 
more sustainable energy supply system. Methane can be emitted at a number of stages 
within the fracking process and such fugitive emissions are a particular concern in that 
methane has high global warming potential. Research on potential climate change impacts 
of shale gas (Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research 2011, p.110) concluded that 
͚without a meaningful cap on global carbon emissions, any emissions associated with shale 
gas aƌe likelǇ to ďe additioŶal, eǆaĐeƌďatiŶg the pƌoďleŵ of Đliŵate ĐhaŶge.͛ Arguably more 
pointedly Friends of the Earth (2013a, webpage) claimed that ͚ďuƌŶiŶg shale gas Đould set 
the ǁoƌld oŶ Đouƌse foƌ ĐatastƌophiĐ Đliŵate ĐhaŶge͛ and ͚haǀe a ŵajoƌ iŵpaĐt oŶ 
iŶǀestŵeŶt iŶ ƌeŶeǁaďle eŶeƌgǇ Ŷeeded to deĐaƌďoŶise the eŶeƌgǇ seĐtoƌ.͛ 
  The initial drilling process and the fracking of shale gas require large volumes of 
water. Meeting these demands in areas where other users are already finding it difficult to 
meet their water needs and that are vulnerable to water shortages, may generate 
increasing stress on resources across wide geographical areas. Following the drilling of a 
well perhaps as much as 80% of the fracturing fluid, which may be saline and contain 
naturally occurring radioactive materials, returns to the surface and requires treatment 
before being returned to natural watercourses. That said although the fracking fluid may be 
pumped into boreholes at discrete locations, once deep underground it is often difficult to 
predict its migration and concerns may arise about the contamination of drinking water 
over a wide area. Groundwater can also be contaminated by fugitive methane. 
 During the shale gas exploration and production stages a range of gaseous emissions 
can pass into the air not only from the wells themselves but also from the diesel powered 
machinery at the drilling site. These emissions can lead to the formation of ozone, 
photochemical oxidants and particulate matter which can be damaging to human health. 
While earthquakes can be induced by fracking, shale rock is inherently weak and any 
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resultant seismic activity is normally too small to be noticed at ground level. During the 
initial drilling phase the delivery of equipment, materials and water and the increase in 
vehicle movements can cause environmental disruption and there is also noise pollution 
form the drilling process. Fracking also has a significant footprint on the landscape. Land 
clearance is required, with up to two hectares required for each well head plus any land 
required for improved road access, and this can damage or destroy amenity, landscapes and 
habitats, reduce biodiversity, and lead to soil erosion.  
 There are also social concerns about the disruption fracking could bring to small 
communities, and to their traditional ways of living and working and of the possible impact 
on property prices and land values. There are concerns, for example, about the capacity of 
local infrastructure to cope with the attendant increase in traffic, employees and drilling 
equipment and worries that the chemicals used in the fracking process could pose health 
risks. In some rural areas there are fears that fracking operations may lead to a reduction in  
the number of tourists and of the income tourism has traditionally generated. While 
proposed fracking operations may have an effect on house prices, oŶ poteŶtial purĐhaser͛s 
perceptions, on the availability of mortgages and on property insurance in the immediate 
vicinity of such operations. The employment of horizontal drilling could also have adverse 
property impacts across a much wider geographical area.  
 More general concerns have been expressed about the cumulative impact of a 
number of the environmental (and social) risks outlined above in areas such as South West 
Lancashire in the north of England, for example, where much of the initial fracking activity in 
the UK has been concentrated. In a wide ranging report on the potential environmental risks 
arising from fracking operations in Europe for the European Commission, AEA, for example, 
suggested that the development of shale gas reserves may span a wide geographical area 
and argued that ͚Đuŵulatiǀe ƌisks Ŷeed to ďe takeŶ iŶto aĐĐouŶt iŶ ƌisk assessŵeŶt͛ (AEA 
2012, p. 24). The AEA report classed the cumulative impacts associated with water 
resources; ground and surface water contamination; gas emissions; land take; risks to bio-
diversity; noise impacts; and traffic as all being ͚high͛ (AEA 2012, P. vi). More specifically 
research on the large Marcellus shale gas reserves in the US (Evans and Kiesecker 2014) 
concluded ͚ouƌ aŶalǇsis ƌeǀeals it ǁill ďe the cumulative impacts that pose the greatest 
ĐhalleŶge foƌ laŶdsĐape leǀel ĐoŶseƌǀatioŶ.͛ 
Reputation 
Public concern about many of the potential environmental risks associated with the 
fracking of shale gas reserves is generally seen to pose a significant threat to the successful 
commercial development of these reserves. In taking ͚a gloďal peƌspeĐtiǀe͛ on the ͚ƌisks that 
Đould diŵ the futuƌe of shale gas͛, KPMG (2011, p.18), for example, suggested that ͚the 
industry needs to control reputation risk and tuƌŶ puďliĐ opiŶioŶ ƌouŶd͛ and that ͚Ŷegatiǀe 
public opinion about environmental safety of the hydraulic fracturing process could 
undermine the development of this industry, particularly where the process is used in –or 
directly under- populated aƌeas͛ (KPMG 2011, p.19). More specifically within the UK  in 
identifying ͚ƌeputatioŶ͛ as one of the main barriers to enabling commercial production to go 
ahead the Institute of Directors (2013a,p.137) suggested that ͚ǁithout a soĐial liĐeŶĐe to 
operate the industry will find it more difficult and more time consuming to obtain the 
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necessary approvals to undertake exploration, and subsequent production activities.͛ In a 
similar vein KPMG (2013, p.25) argued that ͚If the UK is to ŵeet the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s goals aŶd 
extract shale gas on a commercially viable basis, the sector needs to overcome regulatory 
aŶd ŵaƌket ďaƌƌieƌs aŶd ŵaŶage Ŷegatiǀe puďliĐ ǀieǁs oŶ eǆploƌatioŶ͛ (KPMG 2013). A 
battle has certainly been underway within the UK to win the puďliĐ͛s hearts, ŵiŶds aŶd 
confidence particularly, though certainly not entirely, within local communities where 
exploratory fracking for shale is underway or planned. While it would be an 
oversimplification to suggest that either those who wish to pursue, encourage and support 
the commercial development of shale gas and those who oppose its development sing from 
the same, if very contrasting, hymn sheets two simple illustrative examples provide some 
basic insights into the case for and against shale gas development and how the battle for 
reputation is currently being played out.  
 Firstly a number of national organisations and local groups have been mobilizing 
against shale gas exploration and production. These groups are generally well organized at 
the grassroots level, their case draws on a wide range of research evidence and they also 
tap into powerful community emotions. They have been harnessing information and 
communication technologies and social media to good effect and some have taken direct 
action to blockade sites in an attempt to stop exploratory drilling activity. At the local level a 
large number of opposition groups have emerged and are linked under the umbrella of 
͚FraĐk Off: Extreme Energy AĐtioŶ Netǁork.͛ IŶ JulǇ ϮϬϭϯ some 21 local groups were listed 
on the pressure group͛s ǁeďsite ;FraĐk Off: Eǆtreme Energy Action Network 2013, webpage) 
but by November 2015 the number of local groups had risen to 202 spread throughout 
much of the UK. (Frack Off: Extreme Energy Action Network 2015a, webpage). Local group 
Trowbridge Area Frack Free, for example, ͚is foƌ aŶǇoŶe iŶ the Tƌoǁďƌidge aƌea ǁho is 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout the iŵpaĐt fƌaĐkiŶg ǁill haǀe͛ and claims ͚ǁe ǁaŶt to shaƌe iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
with the public and raise awareness of what fracking means for the environment, wildlife, 
house priĐes aŶd the iŶĐƌease iŶ heaǀǇ tƌaffiĐ oŶ ouƌ ƌoads͛ (Frack Off Extreme Energy Action 
Network 2015a, webpage). In a similar vein Frack Free York is ͚a gƌassƌoots gƌoup set up to 
raise awareness about and to prevent new forms of gas extraction in our local community. 
We pƌoǀide a ĐhaŶŶel foƌ aĐtioŶ aŶd ǁoƌk togetheƌ ǁith loĐal aŶd ŶatioŶal gƌoups͛ (Frack off 
Extreme Energy Action Network 2015a, webpage). 
Nationally Frack Off outlined ͚The FƌaĐkiŶg Thƌeat to the UK͛   in graphic terms 
namely ͚FƌaĐkiŶg is a Ŷightmare! Toxic and radioactive water contamination. Severe air 
pollution. Tens of thousands of wells, pipelines and compressor stations devastating our 
countryside and blighting communities.  All while accelerating climate change. And to 
produce expensive gas that will soon run out͛ (Frack Off: Extreme Energy Action Network 
2015b, webpage).More widely, but equally graphically, Frack Off argued ͚fƌaĐkiŶg is just a 
symptom of a much wider problem. As easier to extract energy resources are exhausted by 
the unsustainable energy consumption of the present system, we are resorting to ever more 
eǆtƌeŵe ŵethods of eŶeƌgǇ eǆtƌaĐtioŶ͛ (Frack Off: Extreme Energy Action Network 2015b, 
webpage). Frack Off also argued ͚at pƌeseŶt ǁe aƌe oŶ a Đouƌse ǁhiĐh leads toǁaƌds a world 
dominated by energy extraction and where most of the energy produced is used to run the 
eǆtƌaĐtioŶ pƌoĐess ǁhile people liǀe aŶd die iŶ its toǆiĐ shadoǁ͛ and that ͚the pƌeseŶt 
sǇsteŵ͛s addiĐtioŶ to ŵassiǀe aŵouŶts of eŶeƌgǇ is dƌiǀiŶg this headloŶg ƌush towards 
oblivion and unless something is done to stop it we will all be dragged down into hell with it 
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(Frack Off: Extreme Energy Action Network 2015b, webpage). Extreme Energy Action 
Network provides a range of ͚CaŵpaigŶ ‘esouƌĐes͛ on its website including impact image 
resources, films, flyers and fact sheets and workshops.   
Secondly energy companies, the business community and the UK Government have 
stressed the benefits that shale gas development will bring and have looked to assuage 
environmental and social concerns. The energy company, Cuadrilla, for example, argues that 
such development ͚has ďeeŶ shoǁŶ to haǀe sigŶifiĐaŶt ďeŶefits foƌ the ĐoŵŵuŶities iŶ ǁhiĐh 
opeƌatioŶs take plaĐe, the ƌegioŶs that host theŵ aŶd foƌ the ƌest of the ĐouŶtƌǇ as ǁell͛ 
(Cuadrilla 2015a, webpage). These benefits are described as ͚joďs aŶd iŶǀestŵeŶt͛, ͚eŶeƌgǇ 
seĐuƌitǇ͛, ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ ďeŶefit͛ and ͚taǆ ƌeǀeŶue͛ (Cuadrilla 2015 a webpage). Cuadrilla claims 
to be ͚paƌt of the ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ it opeƌates ǁithiŶ͛ aŶd to ďe ͚keeŶ to ŵake a contribution to 
ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ life͛ (Cuadrilla 2015b, webpage). Cuadrilla also claims that throughout its 
operations ͚ƌoďust safetǇ ŵeasuƌes aƌe iŶ plaĐe to pƌoteĐt the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt͛ Cuadrilla 2015c, 
webpage). Cuadrilla has also undertaken a number of other public engagement activities 
designed ͚to pƌoǀide ƌesideŶts aŶd ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀes ǁith factual information about what is 
iŶǀolǀed iŶ the eǆploƌatioŶ foƌ Ŷatuƌal gas iŶ shale ƌoĐk͛ (Cuadrilla 2015d, webpage). These 
activities included the distribution of newsletters to residents living near to current and 
proposed drilling sites, site visits, presentations to community groups and a free phone 
community helpline. 
More widely some sections of the UK business community have been keen to 
emphasise the economic benefits that the development of shale gas could generate. The 
UK͛s IŶstitute of DireĐtors argued that ͚shale gas Đould ƌepƌeseŶt a ŵulti-billion pound 
investment, create tens of thousands of jobs, reduce imports, generate significant tax 
revenue and support Bƌitish ŵaŶufaĐtuƌiŶg͛ ;IŶstitute of DireĐtors͛ ϮϬϭϯb, p. 2). More 
speĐifiĐallǇ the UK͛s IŶstitute of DireĐtors claimed that ͚ĐeŵeŶt aŶd steel ŵaŶufaĐtuƌeƌs, 
equipment manufacturers, drilling service companies and water treatment specialists would 
form impoƌtaŶt paƌts of the supplǇ ĐhaiŶ͛ and that ͚speŶdiŶg ďǇ eŵployees of the industry 
and its supply chain would benefit local businesses including restaurants, shops, pubs, 
theatƌes aŶd hotels͛(Institute of Directors 2013b, p.2). The UK Government has clearly 
sought to make a strong economic case for the development of shale gas reserves. In 2014 
David Cameron, the UK Prime Minister, for example, claimed that ͚ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg all out foƌ 
shale. It will mean more jobs and opportunities for people and economic security for our 
ĐouŶtƌǇ͛ (Gov. UK 2014b, webpage). Edward Davey, the then Secretary of State for Energy 
and Climate Change has argued that shale gas is ͚a ŶatioŶal oppoƌtuŶitǇ͛ and more 
specifically ͚aŶ oppoƌtuŶitǇ foƌ iŶǀestŵeŶt, joďs aŶd taǆ ƌeǀeŶues͛ (Gov. UK 2013b, 
webpage). At the same time the Government has also looked to answer many of the 
environmental concerns outlined earlier. A study of the potential greenhouse gas emissions 
from the production of shale gas in the UK, for example, commissioned in 2012 by the UK 
GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s DepartŵeŶt of EŶergǇ aŶd Cliŵate ChaŶge ;MaĐkaǇ aŶd StoŶe ϮϬϭϯ, p.ϯϳͿ, 
concluded that ͚ǁith the ƌight safeguaƌds iŶ plaĐe, the Ŷet effeĐt oŶ UK gƌeeŶhouse gas 
emissions from shale gas production in the UK will be relatively small.͛ The Government has 
also looked to present shale gas as the ͚ĐleaŶest fossil fuel͛ (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change 2013, p.10) which would help, as part of a diverse energy mix, to act as a 
bridge in the transition to a low carbon future.  
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 The Government has also stressed that shale gas development ͛ŵust ďe doŶe iŶ 
paƌtŶeƌship ǁith loĐal people͛ and that it wants ͚to eŶĐouƌage a shale iŶdustƌǇ that is safe 
aŶd doesŶ͛t daŵage the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt,͛ (GOV. UK 2013a, webpage). In March 2013 the 
Government announced the creation of the new Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil 
ǁithiŶ the DepartŵeŶt of EŶergǇ aŶd Cliŵate ChaŶge. This OffiĐe plaŶs, iŶter alia, to ͚bring 
forward proposals to ensure people benefit from shale gas production if there are future 
deǀelopŵeŶts iŶ theiƌ aƌea͛ (Gov. UK 2013c, webpage). In 2014 the Government introduced 
a package of benefits, including financial support, for communities located close to 
exploratory wells and local councils in such areas will be able to retain 100%, as opposed to 
the existing 50/%, of business rates from any shale gas developments (Gov. UK 2014b, 
webpage). 
Regulation and the Planning Framework 
 Shale gas within the UK is owned by the state, under the Petroleum Act of 1988, and 
a Petroleum and Exploration and Development Licence (PEDL) is required for the 
development of shale gas reserves. At the time of writing (November 2015) the UK 
government had issued licences to a range of energy companies for 203 blocks, each about 
4 miles square, and these licences confer exclusive rights to undertake exploratory drilling 
and production of shale gas (White, Felt, Smith and Keep 2015). Licences in themselves do 
not give consent for fracking and a number of other permissions are required before a 
company can begin exploratory or production drilling for shale gas. More specifically 
companies must gain access rights from the landowners, obtain both the relevant 
environmental permits to drill froŵ the UK͛s DepartŵeŶt for EŶergǇ aŶd Cliŵate ChaŶge, 
ŵeet the UK͛s Health aŶd SafetǇ EǆeĐutiǀe͛s health aŶd safety regulations and obtain local 
authority planning permission. Where fluids used in the fracking process contain pollutants, 
for example, theŶ aŶ eŶǀiroŶŵeŶtal perŵit ŵust ďe oďtaiŶed froŵ the UK͛s EŶǀiroŶŵeŶt 
Agency. The Environment Agency will also take account of the potential impacts of fracking 
on groundwater levels and the appropriate consents may be required before drilling can 
commence.  The Health and Safety Executive is responsible for monitoring safe working 
practices and the integrity of borehole operations.  
Within the UK it is the local minerals planning authority that is responsible for 
determining if shale gas exploration and production by fracking is acceptable at specific 
sites. Given the scale of recent estimates of shale gas reserves local minerals planning 
authorities in many parts of the UK seem likely to face a growing number of applications for 
shale gas exploration and production.  Some national planning guidelines have recently 
been published which might be seen to help local minerals planning authorities in 
determining such applications. The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) for England 
and Wales published in 2012, for example, did not explicitly mention fracking and thus it 
offered nothing by way of specific guidance for local planning authorities. That said 
potentially contradictorily the NPPF stressed the need ͚to help iŶĐƌease the use aŶd supplǇ 
of renewable and low carbon energy, local authorities should recognise the responsibility on 
all ĐoŵŵuŶities to ĐoŶtƌiďute to eŶeƌgǇ geŶeƌatioŶ fƌoŵ ƌeŶeǁaďle aŶd loǁ ĐaƌďoŶ souƌĐes͛ 
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2012, p. 22.) That said the NPPF also 
emphasised the need ͚to ƌespoŶd to the ĐhaŶges that Ŷeǁ teĐhŶologies offeƌ us͛, to 
͚aĐĐoŵŵodate the Ŷeǁ ǁaǇs ďǇ ǁhiĐh ǁe ǁill eaƌŶ ouƌ liǀiŶg iŶ a Đoŵpetitiǀe ǁoƌld͛ 
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(Department for Communities and Local Government 2012, p. 1) and to ͚giǀe gƌeat ǁeigh to 
the ďeŶefits of ŵiŶeƌal eǆtƌaĐtioŶ, iŶĐludiŶg to the eĐoŶoŵǇ͛   (Department for Communities 
and Local Government 2012, p34).  
 
However in 2013 the Government published planning practice guidance for onshore 
oil and gas exploration and production for England. This guidance provides advice on ͚hoǁ 
shale gas development should proceed through EŶglaŶd͛s plaŶŶiŶg sǇsteŵ͛ (Department for 
Communities and Local Government 2013) and included advice on development 
management procedures, environmental impact assessment, determining planning 
applications and decommissioning and land restoration. This guidance on the need to 
conduct an environmental impact assessment, for example, suggested that such an 
assessment would only be required ͚if the pƌojeĐt is likelǇ to haǀe sigŶifiĐaŶt eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal 
effeĐts͛ and that ͚it is uŶlikelǇ that aŶ EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal Impact assessment will be required for 
eǆploƌatoƌǇ dƌilliŶg opeƌatioŶs͛ (Department for Communities and Local government 2013, 
p.13). Planning authorities are also advised to take account of the possible cumulative 
effects of one or more applications for shale gas development within an area but here again 
the advice is that such cumulative effects are unlikely at the exploration phase. The 
guidance lists some 16 environmental issues including noise, landscape character, land 
contamination and flood risk, which should be addressed by planning authorities. More 
generally local planning authorities are advised that they must ensure that shale gas 
development is appropriate to its location and that it does not have an unacceptable 
adverse impact on the natural or historic environment or human health (Department for 
Communities and Local Government 2013). In determining planning applications for shale 
gas exploration and production, local authorities were advised that while they should not 
consider the demand for, or the alternatives to shale gas but that they should ͚giǀe gƌeat 
ǁeight to the ďeŶefits of ŵiŶeƌal eǆtƌaĐtioŶ͛ (Department for Communities and Local 
government 2013, p. 15). 
While the guidance sought to provide greater clarity about the planning process for 
shale gas exploration and extraction it was not universally well received. Within the 
planning profession some critics have argued that this guidance was weighted in favour of 
graŶtiŶg perŵissioŶ. A priŶĐipal plaŶŶer at Saǀills, the UK͛s leadiŶg estate agency, for 
example, was reported as arguing that the guidance was akin to a presumption in favour of 
the development of shale gas resources and more specifically that ͚ƌatheƌ thaŶ just 
introducing controls over how decisions would be made, the guidance implies that 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁaŶts to see theŵ go thƌough͛ (Planning Resource 2013, webpage).   
 Pinsent Masons (2013, p.2), a UK based law firm with specific expertise in energy 
and natural resources and real estate, for example, suggested that the guidance was not 
comprehensive. More specifically Pinsent Masons  argued ͚theƌe aƌe aƌeas ǁheƌe soŵe iŶ 
the industry may find that guidance is lacking: for example, in its failure to tackle key 
questions such as how planning boundaries should be drawn for directional and horizontal 
drilling once the appropriate rock formation is reached, how to deal with issues where the 
surface and subsurface are in different ownership and the way in which the guidance deals 
with the consideration of alternatives in the context of need aŶd deŵaŶd.͛  More critically 
Friends of the Earth (2013b, webpage) has criticized this guidance, arguing that it ͚ǁill ƌide 
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roughshod over local concerns about shale gas exploration and development with little 
regard for the impact on the wellbeing of loĐal people oƌ the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt͛ and that it is ͚little 
more than a carte blanche to dispatch dirty energy companies into the British countryside to 
staƌt siŶkiŶg thousaŶds of Ŷeǁ fƌaĐkiŶg ǁells.͛  
In June 2015 the first, and currently the only, planning applications to permit shale 
gas production by fracking in the UK, on two sites, at Roseacre Wood in Preston  and at 
Little Plumpton, between Blackpool and Preston in Fylde, West Lancashire,  submitted by 
the energy company Cuadrilla, were rejected by Lancashire County Council planning 
authority. The application at the Plumpton site, for example, was rejected for two reasons. 
Firstly ͚The deǀelopŵeŶt ǁould Đause aŶ uŶaĐĐeptaďle adǀeƌse iŵpaĐt oŶ the laŶdsĐape, 
arising from the drilling equipment, noise mitigation equipment, storage plant, flare stacks 
and other associated development. The combined effect would result in an adverse 
urbanising effect on the open and rural character of the landscape and visual amenity of the 
residents contrary to policy DM2 Lancashire Minerals and Waste local Plan and Policy EP11 
of the FǇlde LoĐal PlaŶ.͛  Secondly ͚The deǀelopŵeŶt ǁould Đause uŶaĐĐeptaďle Ŷoise iŵpaĐt 
resulting in a detrimental impact on the amenity of local residents which could not be 
adequately controlled by condition contrary to Policy DM2 of the Lancashire Minerals and 
Waste LoĐal PlaŶ aŶd PoliĐǇ EP27 of the FǇlde LoĐal PlaŶ͛ (Lancashire County Council 2015). 
In July 2015 Cuadrilla announced their intention to formally appeal against Lancashire 
County Council͛s refusal of planning permission for fracking at the two sites and the appeals 
were subsequently submitted in September 2015. 
  
Seemingly, though not explicitly, in response to LaŶĐashire CouŶtǇ CouŶĐil͛s rejection 
of these two applications  and perhaps because of the signal it might be seen to send to 
other local planning authorities, in August 2015,  the UK GovernmeŶt aŶŶouŶĐed that ͚shale 
gas plaŶŶiŶg appliĐatioŶs ǁill ďe fast tƌaĐked thƌough  a Ŷeǁ dediĐated plaŶŶiŶg pƌoĐess͛ 
(Gov..UK 2015). The objective was ͚to eŶsuƌe shale appliĐatioŶs ĐaŶ͛t ďe fƌustƌated ďǇ sloǁ 
and confused decision making amongst councils (local planning authorities), which benefits 
Ŷo oŶe͛ and a number of specific measures were included in the announcement. The 
Secretary of State for the Department for Communities and Local Government can call in 
shale gas planning applications on a case by case basis, thus removing the decision making 
process from the local planning authority and can also call in shale gas applications that 
have not been determined by local planning authorities within the 16 week statutory 
timeframe. More pointedly where local authorities repeatedly fail to determine shale gas 
applications within the statutory time frame could lose their right to determine any such 
future applications.  At the same time the emphasis will ensure that any applications called 
in and all appeals are prioritised ďǇ the GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s PlaŶŶiŶg IŶspeĐtorate.  
  
While it remains to be seen how these new measures will play out in reality they 
attracted widespread criticism when announced. Local authority politicians in Lancashire, 
for example, expressed concerns about proposals which may effectively take decisions 
about the fracking of shale gas away from the locally elected representatives. At the same 
time there are also concerns that in submitting planning applications for fracking shale 
energy companies may include large amounts of detailed technical data and documentation 
in support of their application and the local planning authority may find this very difficult to 
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assimilate and evaluate within the statutory 16 week time frame. Where local community 
groups and environmental organisations also look to make detailed and wide ranging 
representations to the local planning authority this may further exacerbate delays and 
effectively play into the hands of the applicants. Friends of the Earth (2015) argued 
͚ďulldoziŶg fƌaĐkiŶg appliĐatioŶs thƌough the plaŶŶiŶg sǇsteŵ, agaiŶst the ǁishes of loĐal 
people and councils, will simply fan the flames of mistrust and opposition. Local authorities 
have been following the rules. These changes are being made because the Government 
doesŶ͛t agƌee ǁith the deŵoĐƌatiĐ deĐisioŶs ĐouŶĐils haǀe ďeeŶ ŵakiŶg.͛ More generally a 
report on the potential environmental impacts of fracking for shale gas undertaken for a 
range of UK nature conservation organisations concluded ͚the ĐuƌƌeŶt ƌegulatoƌǇ ƌegiŵe is 
not fit for purpose and therefore unable to adequately manage serious environmental risks 
that may arise from individual pƌojeĐts aŶd Đuŵulatiǀe deǀelopŵeŶt͛ (Moore et.al.  2014, p. 
26). 
 
Conclusion  
 
The commercial exploitation of shale gas reserves is very much at the exploratory 
stage in the UK but the pressures for the commercial development of these reserves by 
fracking have gained momentum in a number of areas.  Opinion is sharply divided about the 
potential economic benefits and environmental risks of such development. While the UK 
Government and the business community have generally been keen to stress the economic 
benefits the development of shale gas could bring nationally and locally, a range of 
environmental pressure groups are energetically and vociferously opposed to such 
development. Within the shale gas industry there certainly is a broad consensus that 
promoting positive messages about shale gas development and managing and countering 
many of the negative public views about such developments are essential if shale gas 
resources are to be successfully exploited commercially. To this end a number of the energy 
companies have engaged public relations companies to develop comprehensive, coherent 
and co-ordinated media relations campaigns in an attempt to win hearts and minds at both 
the local and national levels. However the scale of the challenges should not be 
underestimated. The independent global risks consultancy, Control Risks (2013, p1), for 
example has argued that ͚the oil aŶd gas iŶdustƌǇ has laƌgelǇ failed to appƌeĐiate soĐial aŶd 
political risks and has repeatedly been caught off guard by the sophistication, speed and 
influence of anti-fƌaĐkiŶg aĐtiǀists.͛ 
 
Given current Government thinking local minerals planning authorities in many parts 
of the UK may receive a growing number of planning applications for shale gas exploration 
and development and they seem likely to have the primary regulatory responsibility for 
determining whether initial exploration for, and subsequent production of, shale gas 
reserves goes ahead.  As such in looking to reconcile competing interests at the local level 
planning authorities may have to balance the potential inward investment and job creation 
benefits claimed for such exploration and development and their commitments to 
sustainability and to the transition to a low carbon future and deeply held local 
environmental and community concerns. That notwithstanding there is a body of opinion 
that suggests that the direction of thinking adopted by the UK Government is, at best, 
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flawed and at worst, weighted in favour of  the development of shale gas reserves.  More 
generally the potential economic benefits and environmental risks associated with fracking 
for shale gas can be seen in terms of a local and national framework. Thus while major 
national economic and energy benefits are claimed for the development of shale gas the 
environmental risks are concentrated at the local level many.  
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